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CHARTERS, THE NEW MODE: SETTING A NEW
COURSE FOR INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION
JERROLD SCOUTT, JR.*
FRANK J. COSTELLO* *
"Public opinion's always in ad-
vance of the Law."
John Galsworthy, Windows,
Act 1
In the final issue of Volume 38 of this JOURNAL, Mr. Robert
M. Lichtman presented an argument for the regularization of the
legal status of international air charter services through the use of
a system of bilateral agreements. In this article, the authors argue
that a multilateral approach is the most direct and efficient method
of establishing the international rights of non-scheduled air trans-
portation. Despite the difference in approaches to the problem, the
authors join Mr. Lichtman in emphasizing the need for an inter-
national system comprised of both non-scheduled and scheduled
services. The authors believe that the present de jure regime that
relies almost exclusively on scheduled services has not satisfied the
needs of the public. They urge instead that all nations should work
for "freedom of the skies" by the elimination of unnecessary re-
strictions on charter services; there should be a de jure recognition
of the new system of "barter" for international charter air trans-
portation.
NTERNATIONAL air transportation is not unlike any other
international exchange of commercial rights. It is a method of
barter employing a currency that is based on political, social and
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tor of World Airways, Inc.
* * A.B., Dartmouth College; J.D., Georgetown University School of Law.
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economic imperatives. The final product of the barter is the ration-
alization of these political and economic imperatives at the inter-
national level, which in turn, creates a de jure regime for interna-
tional air transportation. At the present time, this regime is almost
the exclusive province of scheduled air services established, for the
most part, on a bilateral basis. One of the purposes of this article is
to explore how this course was set, particularly as it relates to the
new phenomenon of international charter services.
In contrast to scheduled services, charter or nonscheduled serv-
ices are almost entirely a de facto creation of the last decade.
Despite their recent birth and limited de jure status, charter services
have become an increasingly important force in international avia-
tion and are at the center of one of the greatest controversies in the
history of international commerce. The mere existence of these
services is an indication that the old method of barter is incomplete
and that there are additional imperatives to be considered.
I. THE PRESENT COURSE: IS INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION REALLY GOING ANYWHERE?
It would not be unfair to describe the present de jure regime of
international air transportation as essentially a pattern of sched-
uled services with generous political overtones. In this context,
"scheduled" services are those services with certain basic character-
istics such as point-to-point routes and an emphasis on a maximum
number of frequent flights in regular, repetitive series. Although the
de jure regime is only twenty-five years old, the political overtones
and route-regularity-frequency concepts are older. Looking back
at this history, one cannot help but wonder whether the passage of
time instills respect or merely dulls the mind, for it is obvious that
the policy considerations that may have been valid sixty, forty-five
or even twenty-five years ago are totally irrelevant today. In other
words, the present course was established to avoid obstacles that
no longer exist.
A. The Legacy of the Early Years
If quantum leaps in technology are accurate milestones for com-
merical air transportation, there have been two: December 13,
1903, with a 284 yard flight across a North Carolina sand dune;'
'First Flight, by the Wright Brothers at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.
INTERNATIONAL AIR CHARTERS
and May 2, 1952, with a 5,638 mile flight from London to Johan-
nesburg.' The intervening years of technological maturation and
political and economic development, however, tell the real story of
international air transportation. For example, one distinguished
commentator viewed this period as follows:
The structure of world civil aviation has been fashioned by many
forces amongst which economic logic has played only a modest
part. There has rarely been a time in the short history of air trans-
port when governments have not taken a hand, for better or worse,
in determining the way in which air services should be developed.
The reasons for this interest of governments in the airlines have
included considerations of airspace sovereignty; the desire to main-
tain a strategic reserve of aircraft which can be mobilized in time
of war; the fact that transport everywhere involves major political,
economic and social implications; and the necessity of enforcing
standards of air safety in the interests of the traveling public.'
1. Air transportation as a political pawn
Prior to the First World War, air transportation was at best a
curiosity and at worst a potential instrument of war. At the theo-
retical level, it was also a novel challenge to the traditional concepts
of land-bound national sovereignty. The concern over national sov-
ereignty led to a series of conferences culminating in the doctrine
that the sovereign rights of national entities extend to the airspace
over their territories.' The military potential of aviation was the
predicate for what was probably the first bilateral agreement on air
transportation-an agreement between France and Germany in
1913 providing for the admission of civil aircraft from either coun-
try, but giving each country the right to refuse admission to the
other's military aircraft.'
' First pure-jet commercial flight, by a BOAC de Havilland Comet.
'BRITISH AIR TRANSPORT IN THE SEVENTIES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INQUIRY INTO CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT. Chairman, Professor Sir Ronald Edwards 1
(1969) [hereinafter cited as "Edwards Report"].
1 1910 Paris Conference On Aerial Navigation; 1911 Institute of International
Law at Madrid; 1916 meeting of the Pan American Aeronautic Federation at
Santiago, Chile.
' The first actual bilateral exchange of commercial air transport rights prob-
ably occurred in an agreement between France and Germany in September 1920.
Rinck, The International Factors In German Air Transport, 33 J. AIR L. & COM.,
102, 110 (1967). See generally R. FIXEL, LAW OF AVIATION 27-37 (4th Ed.
1967). Professor Fixel suggests that war was the basis for all international regu-
lation of aviation.
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Immediately after the war there was little qualitative improve-
ment in aviation technology, but there was a remarkable quantita-
tive increase.' This increase combined with the strange phenomenon
of strong nationalism coexisting with increasing internationalism
and led to the Paris Conference on Aerial Navigation in October
1919. This conference produced the first multilateral agreement on
air transportation institutionalizing the principle of national sov-
ereignty over territorial airspace, the Convention For The Regu-
lation of Aerial Navigation.! But again political considerations pre-
dominated since no one believed that there were "enough potential
commercial markets among the nineteen states of Western Europe
to justify civil aviation as a profitable business enterprise."8 Thus,
the keystone of our present system-the right of any nation uni-
laterally to control entry into its airspace-was simply the product
of politics. Unfortunately, this same thinking still permeates the
system.
2. Routes, regularity and frequency--chasing the trains and
carrying the mail
Although they seem second nature now, the route-regularity-
frequency concepts that characterize scheduled services are not a
product of efficient logic. For example, if a transportation system
was going to be created ab initio, it would be difficult to devise
concepts as complex or unique. As the Edwards Report correctly
noted, these concepts are not the product of logic, economic or
otherwise, but instead are the product of some mundane circum-
stances. The two most important of these circumstances, and the
ones most often overlooked today, were the necessity to meet sur-
face competition-chasing the trains-and to carry the mail.
Because of limited capacity and low speeds, commercial air
transportation was merely an airborne shadow of the traditional
6 The United States, alone, spent over one billion dollars on new aircraft dur-
ing the war training over 10,000 pilots to fly these aircraft. CAB, HANDBOOK OF
AIRLINE STATISTICS 425 (1969 ed.).
7 3 Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Be-
tween the United States and Other Powers 3768. The Paris Convention was signed
and ratified by the governments of Belgium, France, Bolivia, the British Empire,
Greece, Japan, Portugal, the Serb-Croat-Slovene States and Siam. The United
States signed, but failed to ratify.
IJones, The Equation of Aviation Policy, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 221, 225
(1960).
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surface modes until around 1930. Other than the airline's novelty,
it could offer little more than a railroad; this was especially true in
Europe:'
Speed has always cost money. Up to about 1928-30 several of the
most influential people in British aeronautical circles thought in
terms of making civil aviation self-supporting through the develop-
ment of 100 m.p.h. aircraft which would provide a just sufficient
advantage in speed to make the airline an effective competitor
with the railroads."
Thus, the airlines matched the railroads by offering a regular pat-
tern of service between two points-only at a greater speed.
In the United States, the development of commercial air trans-
portation after the First World War was attributable to the carriage
of mail. The airplane offered the ability to conquer the two major
foes of surface mail, time and terrain, but ran the risk of another
obstacle, weather. For almost twenty years the primary role of the
United States airlines was to provide a system of communication
rather than a system of transportation. Consequently, non-mail
revenues of the United States airlines did not exceed their mail
revenues until 1935.11 The mall carriage obligation complimented
the desire to meet surface competition since both required a regular
pattern of point-to-point service.
Although these circumstances were present within the United
States and Europe, arguably they were not present in the longer
European companies dominated civil aviation after the First World War.
On February 8, 1919, a private French carrier instituted passenger serivce be-
tween Paris and London, the first recognized international commercial flight. On
May 17, 1920, KLM inaugurated Amsterdam-London service making it the oldest
scheduled carrier still in existence today. In addition, most of the major Euro-
pean scheduled carriers were formed in this period. WORLD AIRLINE RECORD 125
(5th ed. 1955).
"Higham, Estimates and Actuality: Comparative Costs of British Cross-
Channel Airlines, 1918-1924, 28 J. AIR L. & COM. 137, 152 (1961-62).
" The United States Post Office Department began airmail service in 1918
and gradually expanded it until, by 1924, transcontinental service was possible
with navigational assistance provided by bonfires and railroad tracks. The Kelly
Act of 1925 (43 Stat. 805) turned over the carriage of domestic airmail to private
carriers, providing the impetus for their development. The McNary-Watres Act
of 1930 (46 Stat. 259) provided for mail payments solely on a space and mileage
basis, which thereby indirectly subsidized passenger services. To this day, subsi-
dization of United States carriers (local service carriers only) is accomplished
through the mail pay provision of section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1970). See CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS
425-427 (1969 ed.)
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haul, international markets. This argument fails, however, when the
history of the premier international airline, Pan American World
Airways, is examined. Pan American began service on October 28,
1927, with an airmail contract between Key West, Florida and
Havana, Cuba. Within two years it had expanded its airmail sys-
tem to 11,500 unduplicated route miles throughout Latin America.
All of Pan American's subsequent pioneering of international routes
was based on the carriage of mail:
(i) In November 1935, a Pan American China Clipper in-
augurated transpacific mail service between San Francisco and
Manilla, but passenger service did not follow until a year later.
(ii) The mid-Atlantic route (New York-Lisbon-Marseilles) was
opened on May 20, 1939, with a Pan American Yankee Clipper,
but passenger service again did not follow until later.
(iii) The last major route, the North Atlantic (New York-
Southhampton), was inaugurated with airmail service, on June 24,
1939.12
In short, every major international airline service established before
the Second World War was established either to match a surface
competitor, to provide mail service or both.
3. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938-a fitting summary
Since the state of public international aviation law had pro-
gressed beyond the accomplishments of the Paris Convention of
1919,"1 the best summary of, and the most fitting conclusion to, this
period was a landmark piece of national aviation legislation: the
United States Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938." This Act was, and
probably still is, the single most important expression of national
control over air transportation. In the opening paragraphs of the
Act, the Congress was careful to articulate its views on the appro-
priate goals for United States air transportation:
12 CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 431 (1969 ed.). Actually, the first
commercial passenger flight across the Atlantic was made by the German dirigible,
the Graf Zeppelin, in October 1928. Id. at 428.
'" The most important public international aviation agreements in this period
were the Madrid Convention of 1926 and the Havana Convention of 1928, both
of which were similar to the Paris Convention. For a discussion of these, and a
discussion of the considerable developments in private international aviation law
during this period see FIXEL, supra, note 5, at 33-43.
1452 Stat. 973. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was re-enacted as the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1301, et seq. (1970).
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• . . an air transportation system properly adapted to the present
and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. 5
This familiar theme had been developing for over thirty years,
but the passage of thirty years would raise serious questions con-
cerning its continued validity. For example, only three years before
Congress passed the Act and while it had similar legislation under
consideration, airmail revenues still represented approximately one-
half of the total United States airlines' earnings; by 1971, however,
the airmail revenues of all United States airlines were less than three
per cent of their total operating revenues.' To the extent that the
national defense mandate is still valid today, it is served almost
exclusively by the United States Air Force's commercial augmen-
tation airlift program, a program that ironically relies on charter
transportation performed by scheduled and supplemental carriers.
This is not to criticize the United States legislation, which is still
a remarkable achievement, but instead to illustrate that the sched-
uled service mystique is nothing more than a response to outdated
facts that has been gifted with perpetual motion.
B. The De Jure Development of International Air
Transportation Reflects this Legacy
The development of international air transportation since the
Second World War has been on a de jure basis. It has also been
concentrated almost exclusively in the area of scheduled services.
The right to operate scheduled services between nations, which is
highly prized and therefore equally well guarded, has usually been
embodied in one or more bilateral or multilateral regimes. Never-
theless, the rationalization of these rights has not changed the basic
currency of exchange inherited from the earlier years. If anything,
as each succeeding step toward rationalization was taken, and as
the underlying compromises became imbedded in the system, this
currency became self-sustaining, as if it represented an end rather
than a means.
"Section 2(a) & (d) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938; Section 102(a)
& (d) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) & (d) (1970)
(emphasis added).
11 CAB, QUARTERLY AIRLINE INDUSTRY ECONOMIC REPORT (December 1971).
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1. The North Atlantic Route Case and a lost opportunity
International commercial air transportation was suspended dur-
ing the Second World War, but the basic technology continued to
advance. The technological position of the United States vis-a-vis
Europe was reversed, with the United Kingdom concentrating on
the development of smaller aircraft and the United States develop-
ing the larger bomber and transport category aircraft.' But most
important, at the close of the war, the United States had the upper
hand in determining the future of the international air transporta-
tion system.
Even during the war, the North Atlantic was recognized as the
primary international air transportation market, both because of
the close ties between the United States and Europe and the history
of passenger liner traffic in this market. Thus, when the Civil Aero-
nautics Board instituted the North Atlantic Route Case in 1944, it
began its most important task. L. Welch Pogue, then Chairman of
the Board, had publicly stated that it was time to "stop chewing on
the fringe of present travel and make a bold stroke to serve air
transportation to the common man.'' 8 The President of Pan
American World Airways had an idea how this could be accom-
plished:
We propose to move boldly ahead in the post-war period, how-
ever, and to provide mass transportation for the businessman and
tourist at low rates unique in air transportation.
We are confident that both trade and travel will come if we pro-
vide comprehensive air service within the reach of every business,
both large and small, and within the means of the average man
and woman.
[We have] the objective, among others, of setting rates so low as
to make it possible for the average man with a two week vacation
to spend it in Europe."
Thus, the world's first "bulk" air transportation proposal was
born. This idea materialized during the North Atlantic Route
Case, into a proposal for a low-cost (three and one-half to five
"7 See text accompanying note 24 infra for a discussion of the effect of this
technological imbalance on the positions at Chicago in 1944.
1" Quoted in Brief of Pan American World Airways to the Examiner at 5,
Additional Service to Latin America, CAB Dockets 525, et al.
"9 Exhibit PA-12, at 2, North Atlantic Route Case, CAB Dockets 855, et al.
INTERNATIONAL AIR CHARTERS
cents per revenue passenger mile, for a 296 dollar roundtrip fare
between New York and London) service between the major gate-
ways in the United States and Europe. But this service had a price-
the acceptance of Pan American as the "chosen instrument" of
United States international aviation.
Although the CAB refused to pay Pan American's price,"0 it still
retained a remarkable opportunity to create a transportation sys-
tem. The CAB recognized that "[a] most important influence upon
the anticipated development of transatlantic air transportation con-
cerns the adaptability of air transportation to the purposes of
travel."2 Thus, for the first time in the forty years of aviation, a
governmental body considered the desires of the traveling public,
but unfortunately it erroneously measured these purposes:
It seems reasonable to anticipate that the speed, frequency, regu-
larity, and year-round comfort of air service will encourage sub-
stantial growth in nearly all of the foregoing categories of over-
seas travel.
It is the nonrecreational travel categories, however, which are most
generally regarded as offering the greatest promise for expansion.
Purpose-of-travel surveys conducted by domestic carriers prior to
the war indicate that nonrecreational air travel ranges from 75 to
85 per cent of total travel. The ultimate effect of the development
of transatlantic overseas air transportation upon nonrecreational
travel categories can only be conjectured. However, it seems prob-
able that growth in these categories will be great compared to the
growth of recreational travel, and that this travel will be well
balanced both seasonally and directionally.
Since at least three-fourths of the transatlantic air traffic is cur-
rently composed of recreational or pleasure travel, this error was
substantial.' This error in judgment was based upon the unfor-
tunate analogy to domestic air transportation before World War II
20 American Export Airlines and Transcontinental & Western Air also received
transatlantic routes. Northwest Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 CAB
319 (1945).
21 id. at 330.
2Id. at 331 [emphasis added].
" The Port of New York Authority survey of 1968-69 indicates that only 20%
of the United States citizens flying to Europe have "business" as their motivation,
which is reasonable since only 18% indicated that their trip was paid for by their
employer. ITA, Motivations of the Transatlantic Air Passengers On Flights from
New York, ITA Bulletin No. 5, at 95 (Feb. 1, 1971).
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-short haul, domestic markets will always contain more nonrec-
reational or business travel than the long-haul, international mar-
kets. This was particularly true in the late 1930's when the domestic
airlines were beginning the passenger business and when flying
required a considerable economic and philosophic commitment on
the part of the passenger. The error is significant because it gave a
new respectability to the old concepts and restraints by implying
that the old concepts met public demand. A nonrecreational or
business travel market can fit into the rigid structure imposed by
the route-regularity-frequency triumvirate; a recreational or pleasure
travel market cannot.
Whether the system would have evolved differently if the CAB
had correctly judged the nature of the transatlantic market is con-
jectural because there never had been another system. And despite
contrary assertions, the CAB's conclusion was, at least in this sense,
result-oriented. In any event, the United States could have changed
the course by its leadership in aviation. Not only was that oppor-
tunity wasted, but another similar opportunity would not appear
for over twenty years.
2. Chicago and Bermuda Compound the Error
The International Civil Aviation Conference, convened by the
United States at Chicago in 1944, and its principal product, the
Convention On International Civil Aviation," are the Runnymede
and Magna Carta of international air transportation. Contrary to
popular belief, neither the airplane nor international law were
initially conceived at Chicago. The commentators have even tended
to view the entire affair with something less than blind enthusiasm:
The Chicago Conference is a classical demonstration of the postu-
late that nations, no matter how enlightened, are not capable of
understanding and comprehending anything beyond their own
national interest. '
This skepticism is justified by the Conference's attempt to settle
the dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom
over "freedom of the skies." Basically, the United States wanted
freedom of the skies and the United Kingdom did not. This is not
2461 Stat. 1180 (hereinafter cited as "Chicago Convention").
'Jones, The Equation of Aviation Policy, 27 J. AIR L. & CoM. 221, 227
(1960).
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the stuff from which great law is made, and the convergence of
these irreconcilable positions in the Chicago Convention was more
circumlocution than compromise. Moreover, apart from the cre-
ation of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which was
indeed a distinguished and remarkable achievement, most of the
important problems were simply postponed. For example, capacity
and rates were not considered until the Bermuda Conference in
1946, and "nonscheduled" services, or all those potential methods
of providing air transportation other than the traditional scheduled
route services, would hopefully never be considered.
By the time the United States and the United Kingdom began
bilateral negotiations at Bermuda in 1946, it was apparent that
international air transportation had dropped the last vestiges of a
commercial enterprise and had become a creature of political policy.
In addition to the traditional political concept of maintaining na-
tional sovereignty, a new political element was also added-
equating participation in international air transportation with inter-
national prestige. Although other political considerations were in-
volved in the formation of flag airlines, looking back it is obvious
that the primary consideration in the development of these carriers
was that flag carriers became status symbols. Moreover, the realiza-
tion that there was insufficient traffic in this system to support all
of the newly whetted flag carrier appetites further complicated the
problem.
But the real significance of the Bermuda negotiations is the lack
of activity since. The Bilateral Air Transport Agreement finally
signed by the United States and the United Kingdom"' established
the practice of bilateral rather than multilateral regimes; balanced
the scheduled system on the thin thread of compromise; and finally,
set forth the political currency to be used in these exchanges. A
quarter of a century later, Bermuda is re-enacted daily as nations
constantly exchange aviation rights, but the questions concerning
the basic nature of the system still go unanswered or worse, unasked.
3. ICAO and the Paris Agreement-With Friends Like These,
Who Needs Enemies?
The de jure regime of international air transportation is not
limited to scheduled services. Although there is a more limited
"' 60 Stat. 1499; TIAS 1507.
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regime for charter or nonscheduled services, it is inaccurate to refer
to the "development" of these services as de jure because this
regime is intended to achieve the opposite effect. For example, in
every instance from Chicago to Paris the role of nonscheduled
carriers was defined by those who had already decided that the
system should rely entirely on scheduled services.
The starting point is article 5 of the Chicago Convention, not
because it played any positive role, but because it still casts what
has become a rather ominous shadow over the development of
charters. The first paragraph of article 5 grants non-traffic rights
for "aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air service."
The second paragraph, however, is less generous on the question of
traffic rights for these services:
Such aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of passengers, cargo, or
mail for remuneration or hire on other than scheduled interna-
tional air services, shall also, subject to the provisions of article 7,
have the privilege of taking on or discharging passengers, cargo
or mail, subject to the right of any [s]tate where such embarkation
or discharge takes place to impose such regulations, conditions or
limitations as it may consider desirable."
Two important legal questions are raised by this provision. First,
what is the distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled inter-
national air services since neither term is defined in the Conven-
tion? 8 Second, does article 5 give states the authority to prohibit or
severely restrict nonscheduled services at will? Unfortunately, both
questions were quickly resolved by ICAO in a manner inhospitable
to the development of charters. Thus, a definition of scheduled
services was devised that encompassed any service open to use by
the public and operated pursuant to a published timetable or in a
regularly systematic service; conversely, nonscheduled service was
service that did not possess any one of these characteristics.' In
2 Chicago Convention, supra, note 24, article 5, paragraph 2 (emphasis
added).
2 Article 96 defines "air service" as "any scheduled air service performed by
aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail or cargo," but it does not
define "scheduled."
2 International Civil Aviation Organization, Definition of A Scheduled In-
ternational Air Service, ICAO Doc. 7278, C/841 at 3-6 (1952). See generally
BIN CHENG, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962). Although the
United States has not accepted this definition, the Civil Aeronautics Board does
occasionally employ it in granting "nonscheduled" authority to foreign air carri-
ers for certain limited operations. In each case, however, the Board enters a
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addition, it was held that the states were entitled to require prior
permission for nonscheduled services provided that this right was
not "exercised in such a way as to render the operation of this im-
portant form of air transport impossible or non-effective."" This
right of prior permission obviously gives the states broad discretion
in the administration of their prior permission "right" since theo-
retically a misuse of this discretion could only be challenged under
the Disputes and Default procedures of articles 84, 85 and 86 of
the Convention, which, to the authors' knowledge, has never been
done. In practical terms then, this approaches absolute discretion.31
In all fairness, the ICAO's interpretations of the Chicago Con-
vention merely reflected the climate prevailing in international air
transportation at that time:
Up to the Second World War the air services normally referred
to as 'scheduled services' formed a class that was so distinct as to
need little definition. Any air transport company that wished to
attract a substantial amount of business had not merely to run to
a schedule, but had to advertise that schedule as widely as pos-
sible. Companies running charter or taxi services found little de-
mand and were able to operate with relatively small aircraft at a
passenger-mileage charge considerably above the scheduled air
service rate.2
caveat to the effect that their action "should not be construed as an expression of
opinion by the Board as to the proper interpretation to be placed on the scope
of article 5 and 6 of the Chicago Convention." Aerotransportes Entre Rios S.R.L.,
Foreign Air Carrier, permit and CAB Order 72-4-84, at 2, n.1 (1972); Aerolineas
Carreras Transportes Aereos, Foreign Air Carrier permit, 41 C.A.B. 562, 563
(1964).
3 1ACO Doc. 7278, C/841 at 12 (1952). This reversed an earlier ruling by
the ICAO Secretariat that the states were not entitled to require prior permission
for nonscheduled services. See ICAO Doc. 6894, AT/694 (1949).
81 Even the United States has leaned toward this view. In interpreting its au-
thority under section 1108(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
1508(b) (1970) to authorize occasional commercial transport operations by non-
United States air carriers, authority that is "designed, among other purposes, to
carry out the international undertakings of the United States in the Chicago Con-
vention, in particular article 5 thereof," the Civil Aeronautics Board has stated
that any permit authorizing such operations "may be withheld, revoked, amended,
modified, restricted, suspended, withdrawn, or cancelled by the Board in the in-
terest of the public of the United States, without notice or hearing and without
the right in the holder to challenge the Board's discretion." 14 CFR 375.42(b)
(1970); 24 FED. REG. 124 (1938); 25 FED. REG. 2790 (1960); 29 FED. REG.
8002 (1964).
32 International Civil Aviation Organization, Distinction Between Scheduled
and Nonscheduled Operations in International Civil Air Transport, ICAO Doc.
4522, A/EC/74, at 15 (1947).
1973]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
This excuse is not available, however, to the European Civil Avia-
tion Conference and its attempts to reach a multilateral accord on
charters." When ECAC was established at the 1954 Strasbourg
Conference "[t]here was ... general agreement that nonscheduled
commercial air services should be allowed freedom of operation
within Europe without prior permission from governments if such
services did not compete with established scheduled services. '
The ECAC began drafting a model multilateral agreement on non-
scheduled services and in April 1956 this draft was presented to
the member countries at Paris for their signature. Unfortunately,
the Paris Agreement' followed the course established earlier by
ICAO and IATA3 ' of restricting charter services to the fullest pos-
sible extent. Under article 2 of the Paris Agreement, prior approval
pursuant to article 5 of the Chicago Convention is not required for
nonscheduled services if: (i) they are humanitarian or emergency
in nature; (ii) if they carry six or fewer passengers on an occasional
basis; (iii) there will not be more than one flight per month be-
tween a pair of points; or (iv) they are "between regions which
In this early period there were at least two bilateral agreements governing
nonscheduled services between the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and France
and Switzerland on the other. These agreements generally permitted nonscheduled
flights without prior permission, but only when they carried four or fewer passen-
gers, were not operated over scheduled routes, or were single flights over sched-
uled routes. Cmd. No. 8157 (1951); Cmd. No. 8794 (1953); see BIN CHENG,
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962).
1 In March 1953, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopt-
ed a resolution calling for close cooperation between European airlines and their
governments. ICAO then convened a Conference On the Coordination of Air
Transport in Europe at Strasbourg, France, in April and May of 1954. It was
at that Strasbourg Conference that ECAC was created and this resolution adopted.
ICAO Doc. 7575, CATE/1 at 11 (1954).
" Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Nonscheduled Air Services
in Europe, adopted April 30, 1956; effective July 23, 1957.
30 Although technically a private body, IATA has had an inordinate amount
of influence on the development of charter policies. IATA began work on char-
ters as early as 1947 and the adoption of Resolution 045 served as a model for
both ICAO as well as attempts by the individual states to define nonscheduled
services. See ITA, Trans Ocean Inclusive Tours-Some Recent Legal and Policy
Developments, 1968/1-E at 20-21 (1968); Goldklang, Transatlantic Charter
Policy-A Study in Airline Regulation, 28 J. AIR L. & COM. 99, 105 (1961-62).
Resolution 045 has survived over twenty years, but the United States Civil Aero-
nautics Board, "convinced that the time ha[d] come to recognize new concepts
of charter air transportation, and that charter regulations should be framed in a
manner which will promote rather than inhibit the public demand for bulk air
transportation," recently issued an order disapproving Resolution 045 as it applies
to air transportation into and out of the United States. CAB Order 72-6-91, at 4
(1972).
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have no reasonably direct connection by scheduled air services.""
Article 3 of the Paris Agreement reaffirms the prior approval right
over all other nonscheduled flights, subject to certain minimal
notification requirements. The fairest evaluation of the Paris Agree-
ment was that given by the Assistant Secretary General of ICAO
shortly after it was signed: "It does not, to be sure, constitute in
itself an epoch-making step forward in the liberalization of com-
merical rights in international aviation."' 8
There have been no significant bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments governing nonscheduled services since the Paris Agreement,
even though a "number of recently concluded bilateral agreements
include provisions concerning nonscheduled flights, either with ref-
erence to the European multilateral agreement (countries in Europe
and the Mediterranean Basin up to the Middle East, in particular),
or with a statement of appropriate principles and procedures."'"
The entire sum and substance of the de jure recognition of these
services at the international level, therefore, remains the agree-
ments described above, agreements that for the most part confirm
the right of nations to regulate these services at their discretion.
C. Development on A De Facto Basis
Despite the existence of this inhospitable framework, interna-
tional charter or nonscheduled services have become a de facto
reality. Charter services do exist and have become a significant
force in the international movement of passengers. In the North
Atlantic and Western Europe, the two major markets where most
of this development occurred, the pattern was the same; charter
services met a demand that was not met by existing scheduled
services.
1. The North Atlantic Market Receives a Second Chance
In 1944 there was a neglected opportunity to re-structure the
North Atlantic along different lines. Fortunately, there was a sec-
ond opportunity to restructure the market in the form of charter
" In addition, single entity or own-use flights and cargo flights were exempted
from prior approval.
'8 Weld, Some Notes on the Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of
Nonscheduled Air Services in Europe, 23 J. AnR L. & COM. 180, 187 (1956).
9ITA, Some Prospects Opened up by Competition Between Scheduled and
Nonscheduled Transport, ITA Bulletin No. 27 at 26,638 (July 6, 1970).
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services. Charter services in the North Atlantic can be traced to
1948 when the "large irregular air carriers," the predecessors of
today's supplementals, began operating a small number of flights.
In the summer of 1949, the Civil Aeronautics Board granted
exemptions to many of these carriers permitting them to carry ap-
proximately 2,500 students to Europe at an average round trip
fare of 350 dollars. The following summer, exemptions were again
granted and approximately 5,000 students were flown to Europe,
but financial defaults by several of the agents and organizers re-
sulted in strandings and aroused public opposition."0 As a result,
the Civil Aeronautics Board did not permit the supplementals to
re-enter the transatlantic market until 1955 when it adopted guide-
lines that formed the basis for the present United States charter
regulations. 1 The tremendous growth in North Atlantic charter
traffic, however, which accounted for approximately 2.5 million
passengers in 1971 or over twenty-seven per cent of the total North
Atlantic traffic, ' has been a product of the explosive era of the late
1960's. Charter services in this market are now offered by nineteen
IATA carriers" and at least two dozen charter carriers, only six
of which operate under the American flag." In addition, Pan
American World Airways is one of the three largest charter carriers
in the market and in 1971 it carried 263,000 charter passengers
between the United States and Europe. In 1950, on the other hand,
the total transatlantic scheduled and charter traffic was only slightly
larger!' Yet through all of this period there was not one agreement
between the United States and a European nation on charters.
40See Goldklang, supra note 34, at 100-04.
4' The 1955 Transatlantic Charter Policy, 20 C.A.B. 782 (1955).
' CAB, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
at 54 (Sept. 1972).
4Historically, the Civil Aeronautics Board has included charter authority in
foreign air carrier permits authorizing scheduled service. In two recent cases,
however, the Board refused to include charter authority in such permits and in-
dicated that it was considering the institution of proceedings to review the charter
authority granted to foreign air carriers. Trans-Mediterranean Airways, S.A.L.,
Foreign Air Carrier Permit, CAB Order 72-12-91, at 3 (1972); Polskie Linie
Lotniczp, Foreign Air Carrier Permit, CAB Order 72-12-56, at 2 (1972).
44In 1971, the United States and non-United States charter carriers handled
67% of the North Atlantic charter traffic, with 33% being handled by IATA




2. Charters within Europe Surpass All Expectations
Within the European community the development of charters has
primarily consisted of the growth of one stop inclusive tours from
Northern Europe to the Mediterranean region. In 1969 there were
approximately 11.2 million charter passengers carried within Europe
and ten million participated in inclusive tours.' This market
originated in 1950 when approximately seventy privately-owned
nonscheduled carriers were registered in the United Kingdom. By
1951 they were carrying 200,000 passengers annually." This de-
velopment under British regulation roughly paralleled the develop-
ment in the United States, but as the traffic increased and the pat-
terns developed, it became apparent that inclusive tour charters
were to be encouraged.
Similar to their transatlantic counterparts, intra-European char-
ters have developed in spite of the de jure regime. In analyzing the
relationship of inclusive tour charters to its own definition of sched-
uled service, ICAO concluded that inclusive tour charters should
be presently treated as nonscheduled and therefore, subject to
article 5 of the Chicago Convention." Consequently, this brings
most inclusive tours within article 3 of the Paris Agreement and
the prior approval of the states. The liberal application of article
3 to inclusive tour charters in the last ten years is partly the result
of a recommendation made by ECAC in 1961.' Although it is
" It has been estimated that non-scheduled traffic will overtake scheduled traffic
in Europe by September 1974 and that by 1980 intra-European charters will be
at a level of sixty-three million passengers annually. McDonnell Douglas, The
European Charter Airlines, Market Research Report No. CI-804-1873 at 13, 44
(Nov. 1970).
"I d. at 3. Although there were some additional registrations, the process of
attrition has reduced the number of British "Independents" engaged in inclusive
tour services to approximately one dozen. Edwards Report, supra note 3, at 33.
48 ICAO Doe. 8244-AT-717 (1962). The distinction is a difficult one to draw.
If the ICAO definition of a scheduled service as one open to the public and op-
erated with systematic regularity is applied, inclusive tours could easily be treated
as scheduled services. The problems this would create under the Chicago Con-
vention and the bilateral system would be virtually insurmountable. See ITA
Study 1968/1-E, supra note 34, at 17-19.
11 Recommendation No. 6 of the Fourth Session of ECAC, Strasbourg, France
(July 1961):
Inclusive Tour Flights
Whereas inclusive tours in Europe make a contribution to the econ-
omy of the countries to which they are operated and have a social
value in enabling people, who might not otherwise be able to travel,
to see and become acquainted with foreign countries; and
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startling that a mere "recommendation" of a quasi-governmental
international body could have this impact, when important com-
mercial enterprises such as charters exist in an international vacu-
um the balance can be swung by such quasi-legal devices. Un-
fortunately, the effect could be substantial restrictionism as well as
liberalizations.
D. The Honeymoon for Charter Services Ends
Since scheduled services are recognized at the international level
and charter services are surviving solely as a matter of grace, what
is wrong with an approach that enables charter services to grow to
their present size? This argument equates limited prosperity with a
waiver of rights. The public has a right to international air trans-
portation, but it is vested in neither the carriers nor the states-it
is the right of the potential passenger to the best possible transpor-
tation at the lowest reasonable cost. Moreover, transportation should
have the certainty of de jure recognition regardless of the form
the transportation takes. The uncertainty surrounding the future
of charter services means that the present level of service could
disappear in a matter of years; or even worse that the real potential
of charters, which have seen most of their growth only in the last
five years, will never be reached.
The problem is far from academic. Within the European com-
munity, there has been a conscious and concerted effort in the last
few years to limit the growth of charters through the imposition of
Whereas many persons traveling on inclusive tours in chartered
aircraft at prevailing low prices might not otherwise travel by air;
and
Whereas inclusive tour charters are not therefore necessarily detri-
mental to the scheduled carriers and have, on the contrary, in some
cases at least, been the forerunner of new scheduled services, thus
generating new traffic for the scheduled carriers;
The Conference Recommends
1) that the Study Group established by COCOLI to consider Non-
scheduled Services and Inclusive Tours should now consider the
principles that should govern the operation of inclusive tour char-
ters, with the object of establishing the maximum possible liberaliza-
tion of this type of traffic;
2) that, in the meantime, Member States, having regard to their
policies of coordination for air services, should continue to adopt
a liberal attitude toward flights exclusively reserved for inclusive
tours.
A similar liberal recommendation regarding student charters was made in
1967. Recommendation No. 6 of the Second Intermediate Session of ECAC,
Paris (July 1967).
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unilateral restrictions. Many European nations, through the ECAC,
have imposed capacity or price restrictions on charters thereby in-
hibiting future development. In the Pacific, Japan imposes a quota
on charters, while Australia and New Zealand have recently made
overtures that would open up the South Pacific charter market to
nonscheduled carriers for the first time. Additionally, many nations
apply the charter definitions contained in IATA Resolution 045,
which are more restrictive than the United States charter regula-
tions, to nonscheduled carriers who are not members of IATAY
In short, the emphasis is on containment rather than development
and restrictionism rather than rationalization.
The critical time is now. Charter services could rapidly disappear
from the international air transportation system; a brushfire of con-
sumer demand would be extinguished because of insensitivity at
the international level. Although mere survival is not enough,
neither is continued uncertainty.
II. THE NEW COURSE: PERMITTING INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION TO SEEK ITS OWN LEVEL
At the present time, there are many proposals circulating con-
cerning how to best rationalize charter services at the international
level. Within Europe, ECAC is again pressing for a further multi-
lateral "response" to charters, but this reaction is probably a
euphemism for further restrictions. The United States, following a
mandate contained in its Statement of International Air Transpor-
tation Policy, is urging a bilateral approach with four basic clauses:
(i) routes would be governed "by formulae similar to those used in
our bilateral agreements on scheduled services"; (ii) no control on
capacity, but (iii) "bilateral machinery" to prevent "substantial
impairment" of scheduled services; and (iv) a definitional agree-
ment. 1 While the consideration of these proposals represents prog-
ress, at most they would be interim or transitional measures pri-
marily designed to preserve the status quo and only incidentally to
encourage future development. Without minimizing the importance
50 See generally ITA Bulletin No. 8, at 171-72, 177 (Feb. 28, 1972). See also
Lichtman, Regularization of the Legal Status of International Air Charter Serv-
ices, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 441 (1972).
51 Remarks by Secor D. Browne, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, before
the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, Mimeograph at 10-13 (Mar. 13, 1972).
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of these "interim" measures, they could extend over several years;
these measures are essential to the success of international air trans-
portation. Absent a long-term objective, however, these measures
could easily propagate the faults of the present system.
It would be ideal, of course, if a simple formula could be derived
that would solve this problem, i.e., a deus ex machina that would
end the disputes and satisfy all parties. Unfortunately, however,
there is not a simple solution and the prospects of developing one
in the future are slight. The present system of scheduled services
has become embedded in the pattern of international commerce
and it cannot be discarded overnight. Despite their large volume,
charter services are a recent phenomenon. Thus, a new policy is
needed instead of a formula. To accomplish this new policy, how-
ever, the old inhibitions must be discarded in favor of basics.
A. The New Currency of International Aviation Exchange
In the bargaining process that characterizes any attempt at estab-
lishing international rights, the medium of exchange is a mixture
of needs and politics. Thus, if international charter services are to
receive status similar to international scheduled services, some
additional barter must be placed on the bargaining table. The two
most important of these are the needs of the consumer and the
economic impact of tourism.
1. The Needs of the Consumer
In the international air transportation system, available seats on
an aircraft are a product and the consumer of that product is the
passenger. To demonstrate that the needs of the consumer have
become diffused in the intricacies of the scheduled system, sched-
uled international airlines produce approximately twice as many
passenger seats than passengers demand and then pass the price of
this overproduction on to the passengers. Rarely have the inter-
national airlines asked the consumer what he wants-more often
they have told him what he wants. The Edwards Report was per-
haps the first national undertaking to face this problem directly:
[T]he primary long-term objective of a national policy towards
commercial flying should be to see that each customer . . . gets
what he wants. Romantic, exciting and important though the air-
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line business may be, it is, in the last analysis, there to... provide
services for money."
Charter services demonstrate that air transportation can be mass
transportation if the price barriers are removed. They are both a
response to, and a product of, consumer demand; in this sense
charter services are unlike any other form of air service.
2. The Economic Impact of Tourism
The economic equation in scheduled international services has
generally centered around the revenues derived directly from the
transportation and how these revenues could be equitably divided.
Occasionally, this equation is lightly seasoned with balance of pay-
ments considerations, but the primary aim of any negotiator has
always been to maximize his carrier's share of the passenger market
and thereby the passenger dollar. With the advent of charter serv-
ices, there has been an awakening to the importance of passenger
expenditures at the point of destination instead of on air transpor-
tation. This is also true with respect to scheduled services.
Income from international tourism is the equivalent of export
income and the possibility of using air transportation to generate
massive amounts of this income has become likely. It is estimated
that the world's total international tourism receipts in 1971 ap-
proached twenty billion dollars, an eleven per cent increase over
1970." International tourism as exemplified by Spain has become
a major industry. For example, in 1969 Spain's receipts from inter-
national tourism exceeded seventy-five per cent of its total receipts
from merchandise exports. 5 Charters were the key to this develop-
ment since seventy per cent of the airline passengers traveling to
Spain from the rest of Europe in 1969 arrived on charters." Thus,
52 Edwards Report, supra note 3, at 9.
"In a thorough balance of payments study conducted several years ago, the
Civil Aeronautics Board estimated that fares accounted for only one-third of
international travel expenditures with direct spending accounting for the balance.
CAB, The Impact on the Balance of Payments of the Air Transport and Air
craft Industries (1965).
IUOTO, The Development of International Tourism in 1971(11), (1972).
"OECD, Tourism in Member Countries (1970); IMF, International Finan-
cial Statistics (Jan. 1971).
"ITA, Tourist Migrations and Population, ITA Bulletin No. 6, at 121 (Feb.
14, 1972).
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the potential is staggering and the only absolute limitation is popu-
lation since tourism generates tourism:
For the time being, these major migrations are on the whole
more or less unilateral. It is mostly a case of holiday-makers going
to a receiving country from a generating country. But when tourist
arrivals assume such proportions that they bring with them a real
improvement in economic prosperity, the receiving countries grad-
ually tend to become tourist generating countries. This is what is
happening particularly in Spain .... Such trends should take place
in all parts of the world and this progressive transformation of
unilateral migrations into reciprocal tourist flows will make it in-
creasingly difficult to identify the real flows and the prevailing
direction.'
"Population exchange" is a rather dramatic concept, but the
jet-age had made it technologically possible. The only barrier is
cost; chartered air transportation helps break that barrier for a
significant segment of the population.
B. The Traditional Areas of Disagreement-Are They Relevant
in View of the New Currency?
Throughout the development of international scheduled services
certain areas of disagreement constantly reappear. The present pat-
tern of bilaterals reflects the controversies over capacity, rate con-
trol, designation and route description. Moreover, these same areas
of disagreement are also assumed to characterize charter services.
Upon analysis, however, this assumption would appear to be er-
roneous because the appearance of the new currency of international
aviation exchange has witnessed the disappearance of the old prob-
lems.
1. Capacity and Rate Controls
The Bermuda compromise on capacity and rate control was a
necessary predicate to any agreement at that time. The interna-
tional scheduled service market was too small to be divided into
various segments. Today this market is larger and there are more
divisible segments, thus the controls might have relevance to sched-
uled services. But charters are a different situation since charters
are solely a function of consumer demand. It is this demand that
determines the level of capacity. It is this demand that should de-
5 7 1d. at 121.
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termine the rates. For these reasons, therefore, the practice of
scheduling solely to attract a larger share of the market, known as
incremental or saturation scheduling, may plague international
scheduled services, but it is unknown in planeload charter opera-
tions. Moreover, there is never the fear that rates will be too high
with respect to charter services, a serious and recurring problem
with the IATA carriers. In short, consumer demand is a constant
that provides the necessary intentional control over charter capacity
and rates."8
2. The Problem of "Optics"
The other area of disagreement has traditionally been one of
"optics"-how the controversy looks from the respective sides of
the argument. The designation of carriers and the description of
routes often receive an emphasis that goes beyond economic reality
and focuses instead on international politics. Charter services, on
the other hand, have not been embraced by these same chauvinistic
impulses and while this has been an obstacle to the growth of
charters, they are removed from the political arena where form
triumphs over substance.
To the extent that these areas of disagreement reflect actual eco-
nomic considerations, i.e., to the extent that they have an impact
on market share, different considerations predominate in charter
services. The new currency, the needs of the consumer and the tre-
mendous financial impact of tourism, tends to obscure petty con-
cerns over division of charter passenger revenues. Moreover, unlike
scheduled services, there are no artificial controls on the potential
of the charter market, thereby creating a situation in which com-
petition can thrive.
3. The Real Area of Disagreement-The Relationship Between
Scheduled and Charter Services
When the smoke clears in the scheduled-charter controversy, the
argument will still be centered around the relationship between the
services the scheduled and charter airlines perform. There appear
to be only two sides to this argument with the scheduled airlines
58 Unilateral national controls, such as those given the Civil Aeronautics
Board by section 1002(j) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(j) (1970)
remain necessary to enforce governmental policies disfavoring discriminatory or
unreasonable rates.
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arguing that charter services seriously injure scheduled services and
therefore must be contained, while charter airlines argue to the
contrary. Although most of the evidence seems to favor the con-
tentions of the charter airlines, neither side will concede anything.
In addition, the Edwards Report noted that there is not enough
knowledge concerning the nature of the market served by sched-
uled services, much less the charter market, to be determinative of
the controversy.
Although this lack of knowledge does not eliminate the problem,
it does suggest another approach. Instead of establishing absolute
definitions and distinctions, the objective should be to learn from
experience and to experiment as much as possible. In the course of
the experiment, the benefit of the doubt in the initial stages should
always be given to charter services since they are an expression of
consumer demand. In a sense this is what already has occurred, but
on a de facto rather than a de jure basis. This system has been suc-
cessful with both scheduled and charter services sharing remark-
able growth. Thus, the goal of any interim de jure approach should
be to continue this experiment along these lines.
C. A Recommendation for a New Course
Although there is no easy or readily available solution, there is
a possibility for a change in direction. Also, more is needed than a
simple recognition of the irrelevance of much of the scheduled
system and the emergence of charters. The following is a suggested
course:
(i) A five year experimental period during which international
charter services would be given de jure recognition through a series
of bilateral regimes. Each regime would be based on the traffic
flows, both scheduled and charter, between the signatory parties,
but the emphasis would always be on expanding the charter con-
cept, while attempting to reach a reasonable distinction between
scheduled and charter services. Each pair of bilateral partners
would meet annually to analyze the results of the experiment and
to agree on further expansion of the concept if justified.
(ii) At the conclusion of the experiment, all of the bilateral
partners would enter into a multilateral negotiation aiming towards
an agreement defining the distinction between scheduled and char-
ter services and granting commercially unrestricted rights, or "free-
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dom of the skies," to all charter services operated between the
parties. A possible vehicle for this multilateral agreement would be
the Chicago Convention, amended to include a definition of "sched-
uled air service" in article 96 and with the second paragraph of
article 5 amended to read as follows:
Such aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of passengers, cargo or
mail for remuneration or hire or other than scheduled international
air services, shall also, subject to the provisions of Article 7, have
the privilege of taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail
without restriction.
Admittedly, this proposal borders on aviation heresy, for two
reasons: first, it is common knowledge that freedom of the skies died
at Bermuda; and second, it is also common knowledge that multi-
lateral agreements inevitably represent the lowest common de-
nominator. While there is a germ of truth in these contentions, this
proposal is realistic when placed in the context of charter services.
Freedom of the skies might be incompatible with a scheduled sys-
tem, but it is not necessarily inconsistent with a system of charters.
Although freedom of the skies does not mean a flood of uneconomic
competition, it does mean the elimination of unnecessary restrictions
on charter air transportation. Similarly, the multilateral approach
may have been discredited by ECAC's less than honest use of it,
but it still remains the most direct and efficient way of establishing
international rights. The possibility of amending the Chicago Con-
vention, however, is slight, but it does illustrate that only a few
words presently stand between the consumer and mass air trans-
portation.
The recommendation in a nutshell is de jure recognition with
maximum flexibility. Flexibility is perhaps the most important com-
ponent of this recommendation, for it would really permit charter
air transportation to seek its own level, to set its own course. What
will be the final course? Only the passage of time and consumer
demand will tell, but this, after all, is what will assure its success.
III. EPILOGUE
This article was initially conceived as a paper presented to the
First World Congress on Air Transportation and Tourism, con-
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vened in Madrid in April 1972. The events that have transpired
in the intervening months have been totally unprecedented in the
long history of international air transportation." The predicate for
the chain of events was the Order of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
effective July 1, 1972, which disapproved IATA Resolution 045
governing passenger charters. The Board found that the IATA
charter resolution impeded carriers from meeting the increasing
demand for low cost mass air transportation and was, therefore,
inconsistent with the development of a sound overall air transporta-
tion system. "
At the national level, the traditional definitions of charter serv-
ices have been rapidly changing. The most widely publicized of
these changes was the adoption by the Civil Aeronautics Board of
the Travel Group Charter (TGC) regulations for a three-year ex-
perimental period."' A TGC is basically a charter open to anyone
willing to pay a twenty-five per cent deposit at least three months
in advance of the flight, subject also to certain other restrictions."
Less publicized was the adoption by the United Kingdom of Ad-
vance Booking Charter (ABC) rules, similar to TGC's but with
" The Congress subsequently adopted a recommendation: (i) that the na-
tions should immediately commence negotiations towards the adoption of bi-
lateral agreements that would provide an assured legal status for international
charter air services; (ii) that the bilateral agreements should be designed to
maximize development of charter air services without restrictions hampering the
availability of those services to the world traveling public, such as restrictions
requiring prior approval of individual charter flights, limiting capacity, control-
ling rates or discriminating between geographical areas; and (iii) that once ex-
perience has been gained under these bilateral agreements, the nations should
meet in an International Conference for the purpose of entering into a multilateral
agreement guaranteeing "freedom of the skies" for international charter services.
60 See generally Lichtman, Regulatization of the Legal Status of International
Air Charter Services, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 441 (1972).
a, CAB Order 72-6-91 (1972).
61 Regulation SPR-61, adopted Sept. 27, 1972; 14 C.F.R. Part 372a (1970);
37 FED. REG. 20674 (Oct. 3, 1972). The regulation is presently being litigated
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
612 For example, a minimum stay of seven days in North America and ten
days in all other markets is required; all TGC's must be on a roundtrip basis;
all of the seats contracted for by the TGC organizer, in minimum blocks of forty,
must be reserved three months in advance; the price must be pro rated among
the actual participants, and if more than twenty per cent of those making de-
posits fail to make full payment no later than forty-five days prior to departure,
the flight must be canceled; detailed filing requirements are imposed on both the
carrier and the organizer; and the carrier may not market TGC's directly to the
public, but instead, must market through TGC organizers who are treated as
indirect air carriers and must meet stringent financial security requirements.
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less burdensome restrictions.' A third development has been the
proposed extension of Inclusive Tour Charter rights, heretofore
reserved to charter carriers, to scheduled carriers as well." The
fourth and final development at the national level has been the
proposed elimination of affinity charters during the TGC experi-
ment."
The most startling developments, however, have been at the
international level. Over the past few years, one of the most in-
transigent European nations on the question of charters has been
Belgium, even to the extent that it imposed an outright ban on
charters originating in the Northeastern United States. This was
suddenly and dramatically reversed in early October 1972 when
delegations from the United States and Belgium signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding that does grant unrestricted charter
rights to the properly designated carriers of each country even
though it specifically stops short of becoming a bilateral charter
agreement. A few weeks later, the United States, Canada and the
ECAC member nations met at Ottawa and entered into a Declara-
tion of Agreed Principles (the Ottawa Accord) that purported to
regularize rights for TGC's and ABC's in the North Atlantic. While
recent bilateral charter negotiations have demonstrated that there
is less than total unanimity with regard to the meaning of the
Ottawa Accord, it is nevertheless an important first step toward a
multilateral solution.
" The United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority released the proposed ABC
rules on July 12, 1972. They are more liberal than TGC's to the extent that they
permit direct marketing by the carriers at a fixed rate, but in other essential re-
spects they are similar. In a related development, on September 26, 1972, the
Civil Aviation Authority granted Laker Airways Ltd., one of the remaining In-
dependents, authority to conduct "Skytrain" operations, essentially a low cost,
non-reservation scheduled service, between London and New York subject to
frequency and airport restrictions. The implementation of this authority is con-
tingent upon approval by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board.
-EDR-240, SPDR-31; 38 FED. REG. 1396 (Jan. 2, 1973). In the preamble
to EDR-240, the Civil Aeronautics Board announced that it is "prepared to grant
waivers from our own ITC regulations to the extent necessary to sanction the
performance of an inbound ITC, so long as it is operated in accordance with
the originating country's ITC rules .... EDR-240, supra, at 14-15; 38 FED. REG.
1396 (Jan. 2, 1973). This raises the distinct possibility that all carriers will be able
to operate one-stop ITC's similar to the European experience provided the flights
originate outside the United States. Petitions for Rulemaking are also pending
that would eliminate the present three-stop requirement in all markets.
1 EDR-237; 37 FED. REG. 24193 (Nov. 15, 1972). Several European nations,
notably the United Kingdom and West Germany, have announced that they in-
tend to phase out affinity charters by the end of 1973.
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It is not possible to prognosticate the status of the system a year
from now, but it is safe to say, as the Civil Aeronautics Board did
in promulgating the TGC regulations, that there is a "current mo-
mentum in the international community of civil aviation toward
devising new charter concepts." Even while this momentum con-
tinues to build, however, new questions arise. As the new concepts
replace older distinctions between scheduled and charter services,
the distinctions between the classes of carriers performing these
services are also disappearing. Chairman Browne of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board commented on this phenomenon in a recent speech:
For many years the existence and growth of the charter carriers
has provided a valuable competitive spur to the scheduled car-
riers. However, the scheduled carriers will expand their capability
for providing for the new market, and develop an economic in-
vestment in that capability .... This is not to say that the sched-
uled carriers should swallow the charter carriers, or that the
charter carriers should devour the scheduled carriers. Rather, it
means that ultimately the two classes will necessarily blend into
one."
This phenomenon is not only evidenced by the large scale entry
of scheduled carriers into planeload charters, including TGC's, but
it is also reflected in the numerous and varied discount fare pro-
posals that led to the current open rate situation in the North
Atlantic. Unfortunately, many of the suggested rates would be
counterproductive-depressing the yields of the scheduled carriers
to levels far below costs while diverting revenues from charter
services.
The final answers to these questions will depend on the results
of litigation at the national level and negotiations at the interna-
tional level. If the concrete results of the United States-Belgium
Memorandum of Understanding and the less precise results of the
Ottawa Accord are any indication, however, the system has em-
barked on a course roughly parallel to that recommended at
Madrid. If nothing else, international commercial air transportation
has entered the most exciting period in its history.
66 SPR-61, supra note 61, at 30.
67 Speech by Secor D. Browne, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, before the
Royal Aeronautical Society, 61st Wright Memorial Lecture, Mimeograph, at 7-8
(London Dec. 7, 1972).
